
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CONFIDENTIAL WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT

January 25, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT:

SCC Meeting on Counterintelligence (C)

The attached discussion paper is for your use for the SCC Meeting on Counterintelligence which will be held on February 7th at 4:00 in the White House Situation Room: (C)

Christine Dodson Staff Secretary

SECRET ATTACHMENT Review on 1/25/86 Approved For Release 2011/04/26: CIA-RDP96M01138R000400010065-4

of Polygraph on U.S. Contraction on Personnel

at New U.S. Embassy

o <u>Proposal</u>

- All construction personnel--inspectors, supervisors, guards, workers--be polygraphed on completion of their assignment in Moscow;

- All such personnel be advised beforehand that this will occur; and
- This polygraphy be limited to CI concerns only, i.e., contact with and/or action for a Soviet or Bloc intelligence or security service or other government instrumentality.

o Justification

- We know the Soviets will be relentless in their pursuit of technical penetrations of an embassy complex we expect to use for the next fifty years. Experience tells us that the Soviets will continually probe for weaknesses among U.S. construction personnel to obtain their cooperation—in looking the other way, in not reporting something, etc.
- The polygraph is particularly effective against Americans. Announcement of an intention to polygraph each person at the end of his assignment will be a deterring influence. However, some will still do something to invite a Soviet approach. A polygraph at an assignment's end is more likely to reveal a penetration to us than anything else.
- Otherwise, based on our experience and knowledge of Soviet technical penetration efforts, we are unlikely to find out what they have done. Our technical surveys do not always uncover such penetrations.
- Defectors from or penetrations in the Soviet intelligence services have at times given us the essential leads to permit discovery and negation of a Soviet operation, but unfortunately only after it has been functioning successfully for a long period of time.

o <u>Summation</u>

- Moscow is not a normal working environment and a U.S. Embassy for 50 years' occupancy is not a small stake. We need every useful protective weapon at our disposal.
- A polygraphy program <u>limited to CI questions</u> for U.S. construction personnel at the end of their assignments in Moscow is a vital necessity.

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